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Introduction
 
Prior to the 1970s, many healthcare plans in the U.S. offered 
benefits without discriminating between mental health and general 
healthcare coverage.1 In the 1970s and 1980s, the cost of healthcare 
increased dramatically and employers eliminated or limited mental 
health benefits in an attempt to reduce insurance costs.2 To manage 
insurance costs, employers began using more cost sharing mechanisms 
and benefit caps on mental health benefits.3 However, these limitations 
were not applied equally to mental health and general health benefits 
and a coverage disparity was created.4 
Today, insurers often do not provide coverage for mental health 
on the same terms as general health.5 Patients with mental illness 
face disability, dependence on social programs, incarceration, and 
homelessness,6 while the mental healthcare system remains separate 
from, and inferior to, the greater healthcare system.7 Private health 
insurance plans continue to discriminate against patients with mental 
illness and generally provide mental health coverage that is inferior 
in comparison to general healthcare coverage.8 Unfortunately, mental 
*Associate at Best, Best & Krieger, Riverside, California; J.D., University of Southern California, 
Gould School of Law, 2011; USC Law and Mental Health Scholar, Saks Institute for Mental Health 
Law, Policy, and Ethics; B.A., University of California, Davis, 2005. I would like to thank Professor 
Elyn Saks, of the University of Southern California, Gould School of Law, for her guidance and 
thoughtful advice in writing this article. I would also like to specifically thank each staff member 
and board member of the Legislation & Policy Brief, at the Washington College of Law, for their 
efforts in editing this article. 
1 See Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current State 
Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 325, 328 (2005) 
(discussing the emergence of the mental health parity movement).
2  Id. 
3  Id.
4  Id. 
5  U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/HEHS-00-9, Mental Health Parity Act: Despite New 
Federal Standards, Mental Health Benefits Remain Limited, 5 (2000) [hereinafter GAO].
6  Richard G. Frank & Sherry A. Glied, Mental Health Policy in the United States since 
1950: Better But Not Well 2 (2006). Although public social programs have been a key reason 
for improving the living conditions of people with mental illness, these programs do not provide 
enough resources to “lift” a person out of poverty. Id. In 1999, mentally ill people accounted for 
approximately 35% of public disability and 28% of welfare recipients. In 2001 approximately 30% 
of homeless single adults were mentally ill. Id.
7  Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental Health Care, 
41 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 365 (2004).
8  GAO, supra note 5, at 3.
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illness remains on the fringes of the healthcare system, especially as it 
relates to access to medical treatment.9
Accordingly, the goal of the mental health parity movement is to 
require insurers to provide coverage for mental health on the same basis 
as general health.10 The term “Mental health parity”, generally means 
that insurance coverage for mental health services are subject to the 
same terms and restrictions as coverage for all other health services.11 
With this goal in mind, this article will provide a brief history of how 
the current inequality in mental health insurance coverage developed. 
Second, this article will examine the current debate around mental health 
parity and will consider arguments from opponents and proponents. 
Next, this article will examine and evaluate the effectiveness of state 
and federal parity legislation, including the Mental Health Parity Act 
of 1996, the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equality Act of 2008 
and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Finally, 
this article will advocate for additional parity protections and propose 
comprehensive federal parity legislation.
I. The Development of Inequality in Mental Health Insurance 
Background/Legislative History 
The modern employment-based insurance system began as an em-
ployee recruiting tool during the Second World War and continued as 
a result of union advocacy and federal policy.12 In 1958, 68% of the U.S. 
population was insured, with employers providing 75% of the insur-
ance, nearly tripling the pre-war figure for employment-based insur-
ance.13 In the late 1960’s, 92% of employment-based insurance offered 
some form of mental health coverage.14 As employment-based insur-
ance became dominant in the 1960s, some plans implemented special 
restrictions on mental health services that were not applicable to other 
types of care.15 Restrictions on mental health services included: higher 
level of cost sharing (often as high as a fifty percent co-payment, lower 
utilization limits) and lower dollar caps on overall usage.16 
Since the 1970s, health insurance policies have been moving further 
away from mental health parity.17 Mental health consumers now face 
9  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Mental Health: A Report of The Surgeon General 
426 (1999) [hereinafter Surgeon General 1999] (explaining that the term “‘[p]arity’ refers to the 
effort to treat mental health financing on the same basis as financing for general health services.”).
10  Id.
11  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Parity in Coverage of Mental Health Services in an 
Era of Managed Care, 7 n. 1 (1997) [hereinafter DHHS 1997].
12  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 56-57. 
13  Id. at 57.
14  Id.
15  Id.
16  Id.
17  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 10. See also Kaplan, supra note 1, at 328.
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higher deductibles, higher co-payments, lower policy limits for office 
visits, lower lifetime maximums and lower annual maximums.18 Thus, 
mental health coverage does not protect against catastrophic loss as 
the insurance industry merely offer coverage for “affordable financial 
losses and virtually no protection against large and potentially ruinous 
expenses for treatment of mental disorders.”19 Specifically, the lack of 
parity in mental health coverage has resulted in out-of-pocket expenses 
that are greatly disproportionate to that of general health.20 
As a result of this discrimination, mental health consumers are subject 
to a two-tiered healthcare system: one for the mind and one for the body. 
For example, a New York firefighter sustained a back injury during rescue 
efforts at Ground Zero and also suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). His insurer provided unlimited care for his back treatment, but 
his mental health outpatient benefits were limited to twenty visits a year 
“regardless of the pain or disability he experiences, for his PTSD.”21
II. Opponents of Parity: Inadequate Justification 
For Differential Treatment of Menatl Health
According to opponents of mental health parity, unequal mental health 
coverage arose due to market forces, specifically moral hazard and adverse 
selection.22 However, parity opponents fail to recognize the inapplicability 
of these market forces in a system of managed care and overlook the fact that 
the public mental health system has facilitated insurance discrimination.
 
A. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard represents the idea that as a healthcare plan becomes 
more generous, consumer demand for the plan’s services increases.23 
Specifically, “[m]oral hazard reflects a concern that if people with 
insurance no longer have to pay the full costs of their own care, they 
will use more services—services that they do not value at their full 
cost.”24 Accordingly, increased demand results in higher utilization 
18  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12. 
19  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57.
20  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 10 (explaining that approximately $11 billion was spent out-
of-pocket by mental health consumers in 2001 alone). See also Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 51 
(Table 4.1).
21  Sen. Paul Wellstone, It’s Time to Act on Mental Health Parity Issue, The Hill, June 19, 2002, at 42.
22  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57.
23  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12 (pointing out that, for example, if co-payments and general 
out-of-pocket expenses are lowered in a healthcare plan, then demand for health services under 
that plan will increase). See id. at 12.
24  See Mental Health: A Report of the Attorney General, Financing and Managing Mental Health 
Care: History of Financing and the Roots of Inequality, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/chapter6/sec3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (discussing reasons for greater restrictions 
in coverage of mental illness).
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and higher costs for the insurance provider.25 Through moral hazard, 
over-utilization of benefits occurs when low cost insurance coverage 
reduces the consumer’s economic incentives to economically utilize 
health services.26 Moral hazard is applicable to the insurance industry 
as a whole, but is particularly applicable to mental health because the 
demand for mental healthcare coverage is more responsive to insurance 
benefits than general healthcare.27
In fear of patient over-utilization, insurance providers have placed 
more restrictions and cost sharing mechanisms on mental health coverage.28 
A moral hazard justification for increased restrictions may have been true 
under the fee-for-service system, as empirical evidence shows the effect 
of moral hazard on mental healthcare demand.29 For instance, the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment found that an increased use of services by 
consumers in response to decreased cost sharing for mental healthcare was 
approximately double the observed rate for outpatient medical services 
under fee-for-service insurance.30 However, the relevance and justification 
of moral hazard is doubtful under the current managed care system.31 
Several studies have found that expanding mental health coverage 
under managed care has not resulted in substantial cost increases, thus 
diminishing concerns about moral hazard.32
Under managed care, the utilization of benefits is rationed by 
healthcare providers.33 Managed care integrates the delivery and 
financing of care with the underlying purpose of containing medical 
care costs.34 In a managed care system, the effect of moral hazard is 
25  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
26  See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 338 (discussing opposition to mental health parity). 
27  See Richard G. Frank & Thomas G. McGuire, Parity for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Care 
Under Managed Care, 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Research, Working Paper No. 6838, 1998) [hereinafter 
Frank & McGuire] (discussing moral hazard in mental health care coverage). 
28  See Jeffrey M. Barrett, Comment, A State Of Disorder: An Analysis Of Mental-Health Parity In 
Wisconsin And A Suggestion For Future Legislation, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1159, 1169 (2008) (discussing 
research which shows parity legislation has no measurable effect on the utilization of mental-
health services). See also Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57 (discussing the economic phenomenon 
of moral hazard and its effects on mental health coverage).
29  See Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 7 (discussing moral hazard’s effect on increased 
restrictions on mental health care coverage). 
30  See generally Willard G. Manning, et al., The RAND Corp., Effects of Mental Health Insurance: 
Evidence from the Health Insurance Experiment (1989).
31  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12. See also Colleen L. Barry & Susan H. Busch, Do State Parity 
Laws Reduce the Financial Burden on Families of Children with Mental Health Care Needs?, 42 Health 
Serv. Res. 1061, 1064 (June 2007) (stating that research has shown that through managed care, 
the responsiveness of consumer demand can be curbed thus allowing increases in mental health 
coverage without imposing great cost on the insurer). 
32  Goldman, W. J., et al., Costs and Use of Mental Health Services Before and After Managed Care, 
Health Affairs 17 (2): 40–52 (1998) (finding that after managed care “costs dropped by more than 
40% in the six follow-up years, costs continued to decline slowly”). 
33  Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 8.
34  See also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1186 (discussing further how the lack of incentives to limit cost 
during the fee-for-service system led to “skyrocketing of mental-health costs in the mid-1980s” 
and the development of the managed care system).
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removed because payment decisions are made before treatment.35 Patients 
no longer have complete freedom to choose among physicians and 
physicians no longer have complete freedom to select among treatment 
options.36 Thus, insurers have greater control over costs as well as 
greater control over access to treatment. Accordingly, the justification 
for differential treatment of mental health based on a moral hazard 
argument is flawed. Although managed care may reduce the affects of 
moral hazard, managed care does not create full parity, and access to 
mental health services still ranges widely among managed care plans.37
B. Adverse Selection
Opponents of parity argue that adverse selection justifies 
differential treatment of mental health. The term “[a]dverse selection 
reflects a concern that, in a market with voluntary insurance or multiple 
insurers, plans that provide the most generous coverage will attract 
individuals with the greatest need for care, leading to elevated service 
use and costs for those insurers independent of their efficiency in 
services provision.”38 Adverse selection applies to healthcare in general 
and describes the process where high cost consumer populations select 
health plans with more generous terms.39 Therefore, as consumers 
select plans that fit actual or anticipated needs,40 the most generous 
insurer will incur greater costs after being selected by high utilization 
consumers with the greatest need for care, such as mental health 
services consumers.41 
According to this argument, insurers are incentivized by adverse 
selection to avoid the higher costs of “bad risk” health consumers and 
limit access to benefits.42 Thus, “[i]t has long been argued that good 
mental health benefits [will] attract costly users, and that insurers [have] 
an incentive to provide poor benefits to avoid these customers.”43 As a 
result, the insurance industry has avoided the perceived additional cost 
of adverse selection by decreasing parity for mental health coverage.44 
Specifically, insurers have designed plans to allow fewer inpatient 
35  Id.
36  Id.
37  Harold E. Varmus, National Institutes of Health, Parity in Financing Mental Health 
Services: Managed Care Effects on Cost, Access, and Quality 21 (1998) (noting that accessibility 
rates range “from 0.9 percent to 9.7 percent of members using outpatient specialty mental health 
services”).
38  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 420, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
library/mentalhealth/pdfs/c6.pdf. 
39  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
40  Id.
41  Id.
42  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57-58.
43  Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 6.
44  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
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visits, higher out-of-pocket expenses, and lower annual and lifetime 
limits for mental illness than general health.45 
However, opponents of parity fail to recognize that adverse selection 
will be nullified when full parity is achieved. In a full parity insurance 
market, all plans will offer equal coverage for mental health; therefore, 
insurers will equally share the risk of over-utilization.46 Further, 
opponents overlook the impact of managed care as a gatekeeper against 
over-utilization, which also serves to limit the effect of adverse selection.47 
C. The Impact of the Public Mental Healthcare System
The existence of a public mental healthcare system has facilitated 
limitations on mental health parity48 by providing some mental health 
services to consumers and inadvertently competing with private 
insurance.49 Since 1987, private insurance has accounted for around 21% 
of all mental health spending.50 However, government expenditures 
have increased from 16.8% of all spending on mental health in 1971 
to 34.7% in 2001.51 Thus, as insurers have increasingly limited mental 
health benefit since the 1970s, the federal government has increased 
expenditures for mental health.
Accordingly, the insurance industry has not met society’s need for 
mental health insurance in an open competitive market.52 The perceived 
costs of moral hazard and adverse selection, along with the lack of a 
truly completive market, have led to inadequate coverage for mental 
health consumers.53 
45  See, e.g. Timothy A. Kelly, Healing the Broken Mind: Transforming America’s Failed 
Mental Health System 95 (2009) (explaining that while insurers can do the same for other types 
of benefits, they are more likely to do so with mental health benefits).
46  See, e.g., Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally?, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 767, 777 
(2005) and Barrett, supra note 28, at 1170.
47  See Kaplan supra note 1 (outlining opponents’ arguments without mentioning role of managed 
care); see also supra text accompanying note 26. 
48  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58.
49  Id. at 51, 58 (noting in Table 4.1 that private insurance accounted for 12.3% of all spending on 
mental health services in 1971, 22.2% in 1987, 23.9% in 1997 and 21.9% in 2001). 
50  Id. at 51 (referring to Table 4.1).
51  Id. (noting that numbers provided are the combined total for Medicare and Medicaid). 
52  Id. See also Community Voices, The Disparity Cavity: Filling America’s Oral 
Health Gap, 1, 5 (2000) available at http://www.communityvoices.org/Uploads/
fiok23y4gwhfkg45ksbde3jb_20020826095615.pdf. As the debate over mental health insurance 
parity continues, a parallel debate is occurring in the dental insurance industry. Similar to 
proponents of mental health parity who argue that mental health is more than just a condition of 
the mind, proponents of oral health parity argue that oral health is a condition of the body, not 
just the mouth. Proponents of oral health argue that the costs of under-insuring dental patients 
are as real as conditions affecting the body. Specifically, in 1989, a study found that as a result 
of dental problems children in the U.S. missed 52 million hours of school and adults missed 164 
million hours of work. Id. at 1. It is estimated that half of the U.S. population does not have 
dental insurance, and one of the main reason for the lack of coverage is the “cost of adding dental 
benefits to existing public and private insurance programs.” Id. at 7.
53  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 51-58.
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III. The Case For Equality in Mental Healthcare
As previously stated, the term “mental health parity” generally 
means that insurance coverage for mental health services are subject 
to the same terms and restrictions as coverage for all other health ser-
vices.54 The argument for this definition of parity was not as strong as 
initially presumed during the fee-for-service era.55 However the argu-
ment for parity under the current managed care system is compelling 
because it allows for the welfare of mental health services consumers 
to be maximized.56 This section will examine arguments made by pro-
ponents of parity legislation, the relationship of mental illness and gen-
eral illness, the impact of mental illness on the economy, the minimal 
cost of parity legislation, and the role of social stigma. 
A. Is Mental Illness Distinguishable From Other Diseases?
“The human brain is the organ of the mind and just like the other 
organs of our body, it is subject to mental illness.”57 Traditionally “the 
treatment of the mind . . . has been considered non-scientific and non-
medical, mental illnesses have historically been regarded as shameful 
personal failings, rather than treatable diseases.”58 However, research 
demonstrates that mental illness is not separate and unrelated from 
general health.59 
Although the exact cause of most mental illness is unknown, 
research has demonstrated that many mental illnesses result from a 
combination of various factors. Psychological factors that may influence 
mental illness include neglect, the loss of family early in life, and severe 
psychological trauma, such as emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.60 
Environmental factors that may influence mental illness include death, 
divorce, dysfunctional family, poverty and substance abuse.61 Further, 
a growing body of scientific research demonstrates that mental illness 
54  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 7 n. 1.
55  See Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 5-7 (explaining that under the fee-for-service system, 
because the welfare costs created by moral hazard is greater for mental health than general health, 
due to a greater demand response, legislation seeking strict parity would not maximize mental 
health consumers’ welfare because the efficient level of coinsurance is higher for mental health 
than general health).
56  Id. at 12.
57  Mental Health Parity: Hearing of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 
106th Cong. 4-5 (2000) (statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici).
58  Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364.
59  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 367. 
60  What are the Causes of Mental Illness?, The KIM Foundation, http://www.thekimfoundation.
org/html/about_mental_ill/causes.html. 
61  Id.
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may be biochemical in nature62 and influenced by biological factors.63 
Specific biological factors include genetics, infections, brain injury, and 
prenatal damage.64
Moreover, the Surgeon General has stated that a distinction of 
the mind from the body is not supported by science.65 Accordingly, 
the stigma surrounding mental health should not dictate coverage. 
Stereotypes and false assumptions that mental illness is not caused by 
biological factors do not presume that with proper care, mental illness, 
like general illness, is treatable.66 Accordingly, healthcare must be 
provided equally because mental illness is not separate from general 
illness. 
B. Mental Health Insurance Discrimination & the Economy
Mental illness has direct and indirect costs on the U.S. economy. 
Direct costs include: “medication, clinic visits, and hospitalization [and] 
are relatively easy to quantify, but they reveal only a small portion of 
the economic burden these illnesses place on society.”67 For instance, 
in the U.S. in 1996, the direct cost for mental health treatment was $66 
billion, or roughly 7% of the nation’s health care costs.68 Although this 
figure is significant, it is dwarfed by the indirect costs of mental illness.
Indirect costs of mental illness resulting from disability or premature 
death include lost earnings, homelessness, incarceration, and lost 
productivity at the workplace, school, and home.69 The indirect costs of 
mental illness are more burdensome to society than direct costs, but are 
more difficult to quantify.70 For instance, in 1985, the first estimate of 
lost earnings as a result of mental illness, as defined by the DSM-IV, was 
62  Kennedy, supra note 7, at 367.
63  See, e.g., id. at 367 n.39 (citing brain research from the National Institute of Mental Health that 
demonstrates the physiology of mental illnesses), Anne Rogers & David Pilgrim, Mental Health 
and Inequality, 128 (2003) (explaining that depression and dementia have underlying biological 
factors).
64  See KIM Foundation, supra note 60 (discussing biological, psychological, and environmental 
factors contributing to mental illness).
65  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 5-6. 
66  See Lorraine Schmall, One Step Closer to Mental Health Parity, 9 Nev. L.J. 646, 665 (2009) 
(discussing that employers may “exclude illnesses based on stereotypes, false assumptions, or 
costs . . . [while] overestimat[ing] the cost of providing mental health insurance”).
67  See Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Mental Disorders Cost Society Billions in 
Unearned Income (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/science-news/2008/mental-
disorders-cost-society-billions-in-unearned-income.shtml [hereinafter NIMH Press Release] 
(discussing the costs of mental disorders).
68  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 412.
69  Id. at 411; see also NIMH Press Release, supra note 67 (discussing the costs of mental disorders).
70  NIMH Press Release, supra note 67 (discussing studies on the indirect costs arising from mental 
disorders).
44 Federal Efforts to Achieve Mental Health Parity
$44.1 billion.71 In 1992, the estimated economic loss was $77 billion.72 
Further, research revealed that in 2002, the U.S. economy lost $193 billion 
in annual earnings as a result of serious mental illness alone.73 
The total amount of lost earnings in the U.S. as a result of serious 
mental illness has been increasing. For instance, in 1992, total of lost 
earnings as a result of serious mental illness was $76 billion.74 Although 
these figures are staggering, these estimates are conservative as they 
did not include all indirect costs of mental illness and the data did 
not include patients who suffer from chronic mental illness such as 
schizophrenia or autism.75 
Considering the economic loss due to mental illness, parity 
legislation is needed to reduce economic loss and to increase the quality 
of care for mental health consumers. Parity legislation will reduce the 
economic loss to society by ensuring that mental illness will not go 
untreated because of insurance discrimination. It is established that 
untreated mental illness incurs a great economic loss to business and 
society.76 For example, clinical depression in 1995 cost businesses in the 
U.S. approximately $28.8 billion in lost productivity and increased use 
of sick leave.77 Tragically, “[l]ost earnings due to depression-induced 
suicide total[ed] $ 7.5 billion,” yet, when treated, “the success rate for 
clinical depression is over 80 percent.”78 
Increasing access to treatment also has a direct benefit for 
employers. Research has shown that work productivity will improve 
by three hours if a depressed employee receives enhanced treatment 
weekly,79 thereby reducing indirect costs to employers and society. 
For instance, researchers have found that “when savings for general 
medical services and indirect costs are considered, providing mental 
health coverage commensurate to physical health coverage for all U.S. 
71  See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Individual and Societal Effects of Mental Disorders on Earnings in the 
United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 165 Am. J. of Psychiatry 
703, 703 (2008) (citing an estimate made by Rice et al. in a report commissioned by the U.S. 
Public Health Service, which used data from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study).
72  See id. (citing an updated estimate by Harwood et al. in a report commissioned by NIMH that 
used data from the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS)).
73  See id. at 707 (attributing the increase from prior estimates to inflation and controlling for 
education, marital status, and household size). 
74  See Thomas R. Insel, Assessing the Economic Costs of Serious Mental Illness, 165 Am. J. of Psychiatry 
6 (2008) (discussing components of the economic burden of serious mental illness (see Table 1)).
75  NIMH Press Release, supra note 67.
76  See e.g., Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 360, 411, 413; Assessing Mental Health Parity: 
Implications for Patients and Employers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of 
the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 148, appendix O (2002) [hereinafter Relations 
Hearing] (statement of the American Medical Association).
77  Relations Hearing, supra note 76, at 148.
78  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 332. 
79  Phillip S. Wang, Telephone Screening, Outreach, and Care Management for Depressed Workers and 
Impact on Clinical and Work Productivity Outcomes: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 298 J. of the Am. 
Med. Ass’n, 1401-11 (Sept. 26, 2007). 
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children and adults would actually amount to a net annual savings of 
$2.2 billion.”80 Thus, by providing mental health parity, a significant 
portion of indirect costs will be saved. 
When insurers consider adverse selection and moral hazard, 
they attempt to save resources by restricting access to mental health 
coverage,81 even though research has shown that cutting access 
to service and treatment will increase overall costs. Mental health 
consumers may overuse mental health insurance benefits and increase 
insurance costs;82 however, by providing greater access to services and 
treatment, overall costs to the employer and society will decline. 
Several studies have illustrated the inverse relationship between 
greater access to treatment and reduced cost for employers and society. 
For example, a Connecticut employer reduced mental health coverage 
for employees in an attempt to reduce costs and initially saved 30%, 
but merely shifted the savings from mental health to general health 
as “it saw a 37% increase in medical care expenses and sick leave use 
by employees who needed mental health services.”83 By reducing 
coverage for mental health, employees shifted mental health costs to 
general healthcare expenditures and increased the direct and indirect 
cost of mental illness.84 Accordingly, mental health parity legislation 
will improve the lives of mental health consumers and reduce the 
impact of mental illness on the economy.
C. The Modest Cost of Equality: We Cannot Afford Not To
The cost of inadequate mental healthcare is large, but the financial 
cost to reduce this burden is minor.85 In 2007, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) estimated that federal mandated parity legislation, with a 
broad DSM definition of mental illness, would increase premiums for 
group health insurance by approximately 0.4% if offered.86 Further CBO 
estimates that the direct costs of mandated services would be equivalent 
to 0.4% of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums.87 
Additional studies have confirmed the CBO estimate, “pegging the 
80  Gillian Friedman, The Case for Mental Health Parity, available at http://www.abilitymagazine.
com/Mental_Health_Parity.html 
81  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 330.
82  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 45, at 95.
83  See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 331; Robert A. Rosenheck et al., Effect of Declining Mental Health 
Service Use on Employees of a Large Corporation, 18 Health Affairs 193, 194 (1999).
84  Roger Kathol, Steven M. Saravay, Antonio Lobo, & Johan Ormel, Epidemiologic Trends and Costs 
of Fragmentation, 90 Med. Clin. N. Am. 549, 561 (2006) (noting decrease in productivity and a 22% 
increase in absenteeism among users of behavioral health services after a reduction in coverage). 
85  Kennedy, supra note 7, at 372.
86  Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 1424 Paul Wellstone Mental Health 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 4 (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/
doc8679/hr1424wm.pdf [hereinafter Cost Estimate].
87  Id. at 6.
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cost of parity legislation at 1%, or $ 1.32 per member per month.”88 
Further, the CBO estimated the total direct costs of parity at $1.3 billion 
in 2008, and $3.0 billion in 2012.89 However, these cost estimates pale 
in comparison to the $193 billion in annual earnings lost as a result of 
serious mental illness alone.90 Thus, an argument that mental health 
parity is too expensive fails to realize that, as a society, we cannot afford 
not to have parity.91
 D. The Stigmatization of Mental Health & 
Unequal Access to Healthcare
Most Americans are unaware of the discrimination faced by people 
suffering from mental illness. In fact, one study conducted in 2010 found 
that 7% of 2,940 participants had not even heard of the term “mental 
health parity.”92 Compounded with the lack of awareness is the fact that 
mental illness remains greatly stigmatized and stereotyped. In 1999, 
the U.S. Surgeon General concluded that “[f]or our nation to reduce the 
burden of mental illness, to improve access to care . . . stigma must no 
longer be tolerated.”93
However, mental illness remains among the most stigmatized 
human conditions.94 Recent research suggests that stereotypes of 
people suffering from mental illness are actually increasing “and that 
the stigma of mental illness remains a powerfully detrimental feature 
of the lives of people with such conditions.”95 For instance, in 1950, a 
study questioned a nationally representative sample of adults about 
perceptions of mental illness96 and a follow up study was conducted 
in 1996 to determine how perceptions had changed. The 1996 study 
88  Kennedy, supra note 7, at 373.
89  Cost Estimate, supra note 86, at 7.
90  Supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
91  Moreover an examination of states with parity legislation shows that the cost of parity is 
modest. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 373 (demonstrating that states have experienced modest costs 
by adopting parity legislation, including Vermont, “where mental health and substance abuse 
spending [decreased] by 8% to 18% while increasing access to mental healthcare by 18% to 24%, 
Maryland, where “after a small rise of less than one percentage point in the year of transition to 
parity, mental health costs held steady in year two and declined in year three,” and Ohio, where 
“behavioral health costs for HMO enrollees fell following implementation of full mental health 
and substance abuse parity”). 
92  Your Mental Health: A Survey of Americans’ Understanding of the Mental Health Parity Law, 
American Psychological Association Harris Interactive (2011), available at: http://www.apa.org/news/
press/releases/parity-law.pdf.
93  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9.
94  Garry Morris, Mental Health Issues and the Media 47 (2006).
95  Bruce G. Link, Jo C. Phelan, Michaeline Bresnahan, Ann Stueve, & Bernice A. Pescosolido, 
Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 Am. J. of 
Pub. Health 1328, 1329 (1999).
96  Jo C. Phelan, Bruce G. Link, Ann Stueve, & Bernice A. Pescosolido, Public Conceptions of Mental 
Illness in 1950 and 1996: What Is Mental Illness and Is It to be Feared?, 41 J. of Health and Social 
Behavior No. 2, 188, 195 (2000).
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found that Americans were more likely to believe that mental illness is 
caused by social deviance, mental deficiency, or cognitive impairment 
then they were in 1950.97 Specifically, in 1950, 7.1% of the sample 
described mental illness as corresponding to social deviance, while in 
1996, this figure more than doubled to 15.5%.98 Further, in 1950, 6.5% 
of the sample believed that mental illness corresponded to mental 
deficiency or cognitive impairment, while in 1996, this figure more 
than doubled to 13.8%.99 Additionally, Americans in 1996 perceived 
people with mental illness as more frightening or violent than they did 
in 1950.100 Specifically, in 1950, 7.2% of the sample perceived mental 
illness as including violent characteristics, while in 1996, this figure 
nearly doubled to 12.1%.101
Additionally, a study conducted in 1999 found “that symptoms 
of mental illness remain strongly connected with public fears about 
potential violence and with a desire for limited social interaction.”102 
This study used the same nationwide survey data as the 1996 study 
above to determine what Americans believe to cause mental health 
disorders. Specifically, the study reported that that 32.8% of Americans 
believed that schizophrenia is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to 
be caused by a person’s own bad character.103 The study also reported 
that 45.1% of Americans believed that schizophrenia is “very likely” 
or “somewhat likely” to be caused by the way a person was raised, 
while 17.4% of Americans believed that schizophrenia is “very likely” 
or “somewhat likely” to be caused by God’s will.104 Additionally, the 
study found that 38.2% of Americans believed that major depression 
is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to be caused by a person’s own 
bad character.105 The study also reported that 47.6% of Americans 
believed that major depression is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to 
be caused by the way a person was raised, while 15.4% of Americans 
believed that major depression is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to 
be caused by God’s will.106 
Further, the 1999 study showed that Americans associate mental 
illness with a propensity for violence. Specifically, the study found that 
61% of Americans believed that patients with schizophrenia are “very 
likely” or “somewhat likely” to be violent.107 The study also reported 
97  Id. at 195. 
98  Id.
99  Id.
100  Id. at 196.
101  Id.
102  Link et al., supra note 95, at 1332.
103  Id. at 1330.
104  Id.
105  Id.
106  Id.
107  Id. at 1331.
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that 33% of Americans believed that patients with major depression are 
“very likely” or “somewhat likely” to be violent.108
These studies illustrate that negative stereotypes of people with 
mental illness remain pervasive in the U.S.. However, research has 
found that Americans generally prefer to avoid contact with people 
suffering from mental illness altogether. Specifically, the 1999 study 
found that 63% of Americans are “very likely” or “somewhat likely” 
to desire social distance from people suffering from schizophrenia.109 
Further, the study reported that 47% of Americans are “very likely” or 
“somewhat likely” to desire social distance from people suffering from 
major depression.110 Thus, it is clear that societal negative stereotypes 
of people with mental illness, “or stigma, lead others to avoid living, 
socializing, or working with, renting to, or employing people with 
mental illnesses.”111 
The impact of stigma on people with mental illness is powerful 
and often deters people from seeking treatment, prevents them 
from acknowledging their health problems and prevents them from 
disclosing their illness to others.112 For example, a study conducted in 
2002 found that when patients perceive negative attitudes toward their 
mental illness, they have a reduced likelihood of believing that they 
need help and are less likely to use mental health care.113 Further, other 
studies have found that 24% to 29% of people suffering from mental 
illness do not seek help because they are afraid of what people will 
think.114 
Accordingly, stigma prevents patients from seeking care, which in 
turn affects the direct costs of mental illness. For example, approximately 
40% of patients receiving antipsychotic medication do not fully comply 
with prescribed regimens, resulting in increased re-hospitalization and 
an $800 million increase in hospital costs worldwide.115 
Finally, stigma is also perpetuated by insurance discriminating 
against mental illness as “[i]t is assumed that having mental illness 
108  Id.
109  Id. at 1332.
110  Id.
111  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 133.
112  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 454. See also Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes 
With Mental Health Care, 59 Am. Psychologist No. 7, 614-15 (2004) (explaining that research has 
shown that less than 30% of people suffering from psychiatric disorders seek treatment). 
113  See generally Ramin Mojtabai, et al., Perceived Need and Help-Seeking in Adults with Mood, Anxiety, 
or Substance Use Disorders, 59 Archives of General Psychiatry 77-84 (2002) (discussing 2002 
study that “examined the correlates of various stages of help-seeking, including perceived need 
for professional help, seeking such help, and from which professionals participants sought help”). 
114  Ronald C. Kessler, et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, Health 
Servs. Research 36:987-1007 (2001); Wells, et al., Perceived Barriers to Care in St. Louis (USA) 
and Christchurch (NZ): Reasons for Not Seeking Professional Help for Psychological Distress, Social 
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 29:155-164 (1994); see also supra note 95 (reporting that 
24% of those without prior treatment failed to seek treatment because of what others may think).
115  Corrigan, supra note 112, at 615.
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is so special that it cannot be treated with … [all other] medical 
conditions.” 116 Thus, by providing mental health parity and increased 
access to treatment, the stigmatization of mental illness will be reduced, 
benefiting mental health consumers and society by reducing the costs 
associated with mental illness. 
IV. The State Approach
State legislatures began to regulate the inadequacy of private 
insurance and mental health coverage in 1971, when Connecticut 
authorized the first mandated mental health parity law.117 In advancing 
parity legislation, states serve a public interest by limiting the affects 
of adverse selection and serve a budget interest by shifting the costs of 
mental health service to insurance providers.118 By 2006, thirty-seven 
states passed some form of parity legislation,119 and many have seen a 
decrease in state budgetary expenditures on mental health.120
State legislation in the 1970s and 1980s mandated mental health 
benefits, but did not address minimum levels of coverage and equality 
between mental health and general healthcare.121 State legislation has 
varied by coverage, definition, and eligibility, partly because of the lack 
of true federal parity legislation.122 Some states like California have a 
broad definition of mental illness, which includes all disorders listed 
in the DSM-IV, while other states like Nevada define mental illness 
narrowly as a “biologically based” illness or serious mental illness 
(SMI).123 The type of benefit mandated by state legislation is generally 
structured as one of three forms: mandated benefit, mandated offering 
and mandated-if-offered.124 The following section will analyze state 
parity legislation by the type of benefit and by definition of mental 
illness. 
116  Roger Kathol & Suzanne Gatteau, Healing Body and Mind: A Critical Issue for Health 
Care Reform, 61-62 (2007).
117  See Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58 (discussing the trend for state legislatures to enact similar 
legislation to fulfill states’ self-interests by saving money and public interest by providing mental 
health coverage).
118  See id. at 51, 58 (showing, in Table 4.1, significant state expenditures in mental health 
services: in 2001, the states accounted for 23.4% of $85.4 billion spent on mental health services, 
approximately $20 billion). 
119  Barry & Busch, supra note 31, at 1065.
120  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58.
121  Barry & Busch, supra note 31, at 1064-65.
122  Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3822, The Effects of 
the Vermont Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Law 2, Exhibit I.1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Vermont Parity], available at http://mimh200.mimh.edu/PieDb/04988.pdf.
123  Id. at 3 n. b (noting that narrow definitions of mental illness commonly include only 
“schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depressive disorder, 
panic disorder, schizo-affective disorder, and delusional disorder”).
124  Id. at 2 n. a.
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A. Mandated Benefit: Legislation that Works
A mandated benefit “requires insurance plans to provide coverage 
that meets a minimum coverage standard for mental health services” 
and forces mental health coverage to be made “under the same terms 
and conditions as the plan’s coverage for physical illnesses.”125 Vermont 
and California have both enacted mandated benefit coverage.126
1. Vermont: A Broad Definition of Mental Illness
In 1998, Vermont implemented the most comprehensive parity 
legislation in the U.S.127 The Vermont statute provides that a health 
insurance plan128 may not create conditions that restrict access to mental 
health treatment that are different than access for treatment for other 
health conditions,129 and provides that all deductible or out-of-pocket 
limits must apply equally.130 The Vermont statute also improves treatment 
access by preventing insurers from excluding mental health service 
providers who meet the plan’s participation requirements.131 The statute 
also provides for a broad definition of mental illness, defining mental 
illness as those listed in the mental disorders section of the International 
Classification of Diseases, which is similar to the DSM.132
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) evaluated how the Vermont mental health parity laws affected 
employers, the state’s largest insurers, and consumers.133 DHHS found 
that parity did not cause employers to drop health coverage or switch 
to self-insured products.134 Only 0.3% of employers dropped coverage 
due to parity legislation, affecting only 0.07% of all employees, while 
an insignificant number of employers avoided parity by switching 
to self-insurance.135 These results are consistent with the inverse 
relationship between mental health and general health spending, 
and support the finding that parity does not increase overall costs to 
employers and society.136
125  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 351.
126  Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at 2 Exhibit I.1.
127  Id. at ix; see also Kaplan, supra note 1, at 338.
128  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 4089b(b)(1) (West 2011) (defining health insurance plan as “any health 
insurance policy or health benefit plan offered by a health insurer . . . [or] any health benefit plan 
offered or administered by the state, or any subdivision or instrumentality of the state.”).
129  Id. § 4089b(c) (mandating benefit parity between general healthcare, and mental healthcare). 
130  Id. § 4089b(c).
131  Id. § 4089b(c)(3).
132  Id. § 4089b(b)(2). 
133  Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at ix.
134  Id. at 57.
135  Id. (indicating that only 8% of Vermont’s employees switch to a self-insured plan after parity 
was implemented, but only 3% of those that switched did so as a result of parity). 
136  Id. See also discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing how mental health parity reduces direct and 
indirect costs borne by employers and society as a whole). 
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Mental health consumers in Vermont have obtained greater access 
to treatment as a result of parity.137 In Vermont, two major health plans, 
Kaiser/Community Health Plan (Kaiser) and Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Vermont (BCBS), represented 80% of the privately insured population 
when parity was enacted.138 However, after parity was introduced in 
Vermont, mental health consumers were 18% to 24% more likely to 
obtain mental health services through the Kaiser and BCBS plans.139 
Unfortunately, BCBS prevented parity by carve-out practices, which 
reduced access to treatment and the average number of outpatient 
visits.140 Further, Kaiser mental health consumers experienced a 32% 
reduction in their chance of receiving inpatient care as Kaiser increased 
the use of alternative programs instead of hospitalization.141 Overall, 
however, the average number of outpatient visits increased and “parity 
improved access to and intensity of outpatient mental health services 
among many health plan members in Vermont.”142
After the enactment of parity, Vermont mental health consumers 
paid smaller amounts of the total direct cost of mental health spending.143 
BCBS consumer cost sharing fell from 27% to 16%.144 In general, mental 
health consumers saw reductions in cost sharing as a result of increased 
access to outpatient services.145 Despite the overall increased access to 
treatment, overall spending on mental health services declined by up 
to 18%.146 Spending rose 4.4% for BCBS, or $2.32 annually per member, 
while spending declined by 9% at Kaiser.147
Mental health parity has been largely accomplished in Vermont. 
However, full parity has not been realized because a federal loophole 
remains that enables employers to avoid parity laws by switching to 
self-insurance.148 This federal loophole will be considered in Section VI. 
2. California: A Limited Definition of Mental Illness 
The California legislature has considered parity legislation since 
the 1980s and in 1999 became the twenty-fifth state to adopt parity after 
137  See Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at 58 (noting “the average number of outpatient visits per 
user increased as well”). 
138  See id. at 57-58 (discussing increased access to mental health care due to coverage by the two 
providers). 
139  See id. (“The likelihood of obtaining mental health services rose between 18 and 24 percent in 
the two health plans as a result of parity.”).
140  See id. at 58 (“[F]or BCBSVT members who received their MH/SA benefits through the carve-
out, the use of managed care arrangements offset the effect of parity.”). 
141  See id. (noting reduced chance of in-patient care under the Kaiser mental health plan). 
142  See id. (noting overall increased access to mental health care through parity). 
143  Id.
144  Id.
145  Id.
146  Id.
147  Id.
148  See id. at 59. See also infra, Section VI. 
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enacting Assembly Bill 88 (A.B. 88).149 A.B. 88 mandates that health 
insurance policies must provide coverage benefits for severe mental 
illnesses.150 A.B. 88 mandates that financial terms and conditions must 
be applied equally to mental and general health, including maximum 
lifetime benefits, co-payments and deductibles.151 
The mandated portions of California’s parity legislation are 
similar to that of Vermont.152 However, A.B. 88 defines mental illness 
as SMI.153 State classification of SMI vary, but A.B. 88’s definition of 
SMI includes schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder 
(manic depressive illness), major depressive disorders, panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive developmental disorder or 
autism, anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa.154 This list is a more 
restrictive definition of mental illness than the DSM-IV and created 
opposition among parity proponents.155
The goal of A.B. 88 is to improve quality and access to mental 
health services for people with SMI.156 In 2001, after parity in California 
went into effect, the California HealthCare Foundation published an 
early evaluation.157 After intervening sixty stakeholders158 throughout 
the state, the study found that “[a]t a minimum, there is widespread 
agreement that health insurance benefits for mental health services have 
been expanded” and that parity did not have an adverse consequence 
on health insurance markets.159 
149  Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, Mental Health Parity-Barriers and Recommendations 3 
(2005) [hereinafter Barriers and Recommendations]. 
150  1999 Cal. Assemb. B. 88 (adopted on September 27, 1999 and became effective January 1, 
2000 by addition of section 1374.72 to the Health and Safety Code and section 10144.5 to the 
Insurance Code) [hereinafter 1999 Cal. AB 88]. Specifically, Assembly Bill 88 mandates benefits for 
outpatient services, in-patient hospital services, partial hospital services, and prescription drugs. 
Assembly Bill 88 is a mandated-benefit statute but provides that prescriptions drugs must be 
offered in parity “if the plan contract includes coverage for prescription drugs[,]” a mandate-if-
offered provision. 
151  Id.
152  Compare 1999 Cal. AB 88, with 8 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 4089b(c) (both employing an aggressive 
mandated-benefit structure). 
153  1999 Cal AB 88.
154  Id. (1999 Cal. AB 88 also provides additional parity protections for children with serious 
emotional disturbances).
155  Assembly Health Committee, California Legislative Bill History, 1999 Legis. Bill Hist. 1999 
Cal. Assemb. B. 88 (noting that while the although the CA Psychological Association supported 
Assembly Bill 88, it argued that all mental illnesses should be included and sponsored a rival bill). 
156  Barriers and Recommendations, supra note 149, at 3 (stating that the parity legislation also 
intended to decrease the economic burden on the public, end discrimination, and reduce “the 
stigma associated with mental illness and the delivery of mental health services”). 
157  See Timothy Lake et al., Mathematics Policy Research, Inc., A Snapshot of the 
Implementation of California’s Mental Health Parity Law, vii, 3 (February 20, 2002) (“[t]
he study’s purpose was to assess the perceived objectives, initial experiences, and anticipated 
outcomes of the new law after its first year of implementation.”).
158  See id. at 3 (including government officials, health plan representatives, employers, providers 
and mental health consumers).
159  See id. at 23 (discussing the assessment of the first year of implementation of parity). 
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There is some empirical evidence that mental health consumers 
received greater access to treatment post parity enactment. A 2002 case 
study of two large California employers revealed that for one employer, 
Employer B, consumers experienced a 24.1% increase in outpatient 
utilization, an 11.4% increase in impatient utilization and a 17.5% 
increase in intermediate care utilization.160 However with Employer 
A, consumers experienced a 24.7% decrease in outpatient utilization, 
a 33.9% decrease in impatient utilization and a 54.3% decrease in 
intermediate care utilization.161 Although we generally expect an 
increase in benefits to result in increased utilization,162 Employer 
A operated under managed care, where moral hazard and adverse 
selection do not control the responsiveness of consumer demand. 163 
Accordingly, the demand curve for A’s generous health plan is less 
responsive and, unlike Employer B, will not necessarily result in 
increased utilization.164 
The study also showed that parity legislation does not result 
in undue increases in overall spending for employers. Employer A 
experienced a 1.9% decrease in total expenditure per member per 
year.165 Employer B, who was not operating under a managed care 
system, experienced a 23.1% increase in total expenditure per member 
per year.166 Initially, a large increase seems to demonstrate that mental 
health parity will cause a rapid rise in healthcare costs; however the $12 
increase in spending per member “was well under 1 percent of total 
healthcare spending for employer B.”167 Additionally, California parity 
laws do not include a cost increase exemption, such as the one percent 
cost increase exemption in federal legislation.168 However, if California 
had included a cost increase exemption, neither employer would 
have been eligible. Thus, the study shows two principles in effect in 
California: first, parity legislation increases access to care; and second, 
parity legislation does not result in an undue burden on insurers, who 
160  See Robert B. Branstrom & Roland Sturm, Economic Ground Rounds: An Early Case Study of the 
Effects of California’s Mental Health Parity Legislation, 53:10 Psychiatric Serv. 1215, 1215-16 (2002) 
[hereinafter Branstrom & Sturm] (“describ[ing] the experience of two large employer groups in 
California that implemented parity in mental health benefits on January 1, 2001, under plans 
provided through a managed behavioral health organization (MBHO)”). 
161  See id. at 1215 (citing Table 1).
162  See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that as spending on mental health care rises, 
utilization of facilities and services increases).
163  See Barrett, supra note 28, at 1169-70 (discussing the incapability of moral hazard and adverse 
selection to parity in the era of managed care). 
164  Branstrom & Sturm, supra note 160, at 1215.
165  Id. at 1216.
166  Id. This figure is significant, but certainly not unexpected when considering that moral hazard 
and adverse selection remained in play in a plan without managed care. 
167  Id. 
168  Ramya Sundararaman & C. Stephen Redhead, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33820, The Mental 
Health Parity Act: A Legislative History 15 (2007) [hereinafter CRS History].
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may actually experience a decline in overall spending.169 
Despite parity legislation, the California Department of Mental 
Health has found that barriers remain to prevent achievement of mental 
health parity.170 The largest barrier to parity has been the difficulty that 
mental health consumers face in obtaining understandable information 
about policies, procedures and routine mental health services.171 
Further, the goal of reducing the effects of social stigma has yet to be 
attained.172 Despite the implementation of a parity structure, the need 
for mental health services is still viewed with skepticism.173 Although 
parity may have been accomplished on paper in California, there is 
more work to be done to fully implement parity.174
B. Weaker Policy Formations of 
Mental Health Parity Legislation
Besides mandated benefit parity legislation, states use two policy 
formulations that offer less protection than full parity.175 First, a 
mandated offering parity statute requires insurance providers to offer 
optional mental health coverage to consumers, which may include 
additional premiums.176 A mandated offering is less than full parity 
because mental health consumers still bear additional costs of optional 
mental health insurance. 
Utah mental health parity legislation is a mandated offering statute, 
which requires insurers to offer employers with fifty-one employees 
or more, an insurance plan with no mental health coverage and an 
insurance plan with mental health coverage with lifetime, annual, and 
out-of-pocket limits in parity with general health.177 However, Utah 
does not regulate cost sharing mechanisms before lifetime maximums 
are met.178 Utah defines mental illness by DSM-IV, but specifically 
excludes personality disorders, psychosexual disorders, learning 
disabilities and mental retardation.179 Although parity is limited in 
169  Branstrom & Sturm, supra note 160, at 1215-16.
170  Barriers and Recommendations, supra note 149, at 16. 
171  Id.
172  Id.
173  Id.
174  Id. at 6.
175  CRS History, supra note 168, at 15.
176  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 352. These statutes also vary by how mental illness is defined. For 
instance, Georgia has enacted a mandated-offering statute based on a broad DSM-IV definition 
of mental illness while Nebraska’s mandated-offering statute defines mental illness by SMI. CRS 
History, supra note 168, at 15.
177  Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-625 (West 2011) (mandating that insurers must offer plans with 
catastrophic mental health coverage, or coverage above the statutory minimum, no coverage 
plans, and 50/50 plans to employers with two to fifty employees).
178  Id.
179  Id. (noting that Utah also excludes diagnoses related to marital and family problems as well 
as diagnoses that are a result of “social, occupational, religious, or other social maladjustment”). 
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Utah, two years after its enactment in 2000, Utah saw only a 0.9% 
increase in mental health expenditures due to parity, while access to 
mental health services generally increased.180 
Unfortunately, because Utah has a mandated offering statute, 
employers have the ability to avoid offering mental health coverage 
by selecting a plan with no mental health benefits. In fact, the Utah 
Insurance Department found that since the enactment of parity, some 
employers have exploited this loophole and have reduced or eliminated 
mental health coverage for their employees.181 Under any mandated 
offering parity legislation employers have the ability to avoid providing 
mental health coverage and defeat the purpose of the law. 
Second, parity legislation is also constructed as a mandated-if-
offered statute. These statues require that if an employer offers mental 
health benefits, then coverage must be in parity with general health.182 
A mandated-if-offered statute offers the least parity protection because 
it allows employers and insurers the opportunity to avoid parity by 
providing no mental health coverage at all.183 Accordingly, legislatures 
should not consider a mandated offering or a mandated-if-offering 
statute in future parity legislation because neither can achieve full parity. 
V. The Federal Approach & ERISA Preemption
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Securities 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) a state solution to mental health discrimination 
was at least possible. However, ERISA provided large multi-state 
employers the right to self-insure and avoid state parity legislation.184 
ERISA regulates pensions and “employee welfare plans” by establishing 
judicial remedies, claim procedures, mandatory information disclosure, 
and standards for benefits plan administrators.185
The primary objective of Congress in enacting ERISA was to 
provide (1) protection of interstate commerce; (2) protect the interests 
of participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans; and (3) 
180  Utah Ins. Dep’t, 2004 Catastrophic Mental Health Report, 14-15 (February 27, 2004).
181  Id. at 19.
182  See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 353 (showing these statutes also vary by how mental illness is 
defined); see also CRS History, supra note 168, at 14 (discussing, generally, results found in Table B: 
Comparison of FEHB and State Parity Laws).
183  See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 352 (stating mandated-if-offered statutes require “an employer 
to provide equal coverage for mental health services and other medical services if the employer 
offers mental health coverage. The employer can omit from its plan insurance coverage for mental 
health as a way of avoiding the statute’s requirements.”).
184  See Gerald N. Grob & Howard H. Goldman, The Dilemma of Federal Mental Health Policy: 
Radical Reform or Incremental Change? 167 (2006) (noting self-insured employer health plans 
are not required to follow state parity law).
185  See Elizabeth S. Boison, Mental Health Parity for Children and Adolescents: How Private Insurance 
Discrimination and ERISA Have Kept American Youth From Getting the Treatment They Need, 13 Am. 
U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 187, 200-01 (2005) (discussing how federal law has undermined states’ 
efforts to provide mental healthcare to children and teens).
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to establish uniform standards for the administration of employee 
benefit plans.186 To achieve these goals, Congress provided that ERISA 
standards would preempt state regulation of employee benefit plans.187 
Through preemption, ERISA applies through a two-tier system. 
First, the ERISA savings clause, exempts all state laws that regulate 
insurance from preemption.188 However, the ERISA deemer clause 
prevents state insurance law from regulating self-insured employment 
health benefit plans.189 Thus under this two-tiered system employment 
health benefit plans must comply with state and federal parity 
legislation, however, self-insured employment health benefit plans are 
exempt from state legislation through ERISA preemption.190 
Since the enactment of ERISA, there has been a trend of employers 
shifting to self-insured health plans. For instance, a study reported that 
two years after ERISA was enacted only 4% of employee health benefits 
were self-insured plans.191 However, the study found that in 1986, 47% 
of employee health benefits were self-insured plans.192 Another study 
found that in 1992, 67% of employee health benefits were self-insured 
plans.193 While in 2003, “fifty-two percent of workers with employment-
based health care benefits were in self-insured plans.”194
These studies demonstrate a strong correlation between the use of 
self-insured plans and the enactment of ERISA.195 “Still, it seems clear 
that at least some and probably much of the increase in self-insurance 
can be attributed to the desire to use ERISA to avoid state regulations 
of one type or another.”196 Thus, ERISA has limited the states’ ability 
to create mental health parity through legislation. Accordingly, federal 
legislation is the only means available to ensure equal access to mental 
health care.197
186  29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
187 See Boison, supra note 185, at 198-199 (discussing preemption under ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144 (stating a state law may be preempted by a federal law either by implied preemption, field 
preemption, or express preemption; notably, ERISA is an express preemption of state law); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Beverly N. Rich, Tracking AB 540’s Potential Resilience: An Analysis of In-State 
Tuition for Undocumented Students in Light of Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 
19 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 297, 309 (2010) (providing an introduction to the federal preemption 
doctrine).
188  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
189  See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
190  Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves 
Another,” 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 110 (2005).
191  Steve Kalmeyer, ERISA and State Health Reform, Health Pol’y Monitor, Spring 1997, at 1.
192  Korobkin, supra note 190, at 108. 
193  Id. (citing A. Foster Higgins & Co., Foster Higgins Health Care Benefits Survey 19 (1992)).
194  Id. at 109. 
195  Id. 
196  Id.
197  See Grob & Goldman, supra note 184. 
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A. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: The First Step
In 1992, Senator Paul Wellstone and Senator John Danforth 
introduced the first mental health parity legislation.198 Although the 
bill was not enacted, it sparked debate in Congress and subsequently 
the Clinton administration included parity provisions in the Clinton 
healthcare reform package.199 Mental health parity did not gain 
momentum until Senator Wellstone and Senator Pete Domenici 
prominently placed the issue in the public agenda, as both Senators 
had mental illness in their families.200 The Senators co-sponsored the 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), which required parity for 
annual and lifetime dollar limits for group health plans of at least 
twenty-six employees. 201 However, MHPA was a mandated-if-offered 
statute that would only apply the parity provisions to group health 
plans that chose to provide mental health coverage.202 
MHPA was enacted as an amendment to the 1997 VA-HUD 
appropriations bill and was approved by the Senate after the addition 
of a one percent cost increase exemption and after a small business 
exception was changed to fifty employees.203 MHPA did not apply to the 
eighty million employees and dependents in small group plans204 nor 
did it apply to self-insured plans covered by ERISA.205 Due to ERISA, 
MHPA failed to prevent large multi-state employers from switching to 
self-insured plans to avoid parity.206 This limitation prevented mental 
health parity for over sixty-five million Americas enrolled in self-
insured plans.207 Moreover, MHPA did not stop insurers from blocking 
access to services through cost sharing provisions like increased co-
payments and out-of-pocket burdens on mental health consumers.208 
After MHPA went into effect in 1998, the Government Accounting 
Office determined that insurers were not in full compliance with the law 
because insurers were circumventing the parity provisions by placing 
restrictions and conditions on mental health consumers.209 MHPA did 
not accomplish true parity, but it was received as a step in the right 
direction by providing mental health consumers some protection from 
198  Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1992, S. 2696, 102d Cong. (1992).
199  CRS History, supra note 168, at 3.
200  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Breaks for Mental Illness: Just What the Government Ordered, N.Y. Times, 
May 4, 1997, at 4.
201  Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, § 702, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006). 
202  Id.
203  CRS History, supra note 168, at 3; see also Dep’t of Veterans Affairs and Hous. and Urban Dev., 
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat 2874 (1996).
204  DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 7.
205  Kelly, supra note 45, at 101.
206  Id. 
207  Id.
208  Grob & Goldman, supra note 184, at 167.
209  Id. at 168.
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financial ruin.210
B. The Mental Health Parity & Addiction 
Equality Act of 2008: An Incomplete Step
MHPA included a sunset provision that allowed the law to expire 
in 2001 unless renewed by Congress.211 Congress reauthorized MHPA 
yearly, but attempts to broaden its scope have failed.212 Although “[f]
ederal employees and Members of Congress, have had equal access 
to mental health and addiction services since 2001[,]”213 mental health 
consumers waited over a decade for Congress to expand the scope of 
federal parity legislation. On October 3, 2009, under the auspicious 
of a $700 billion economic bailout package, President George Bush 
signed into law the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”).214 MHPAEA 
took effect on January 1st, 2010215 and was received with praise despite 
substantial limitations.216
MHPAEA expands parity protections offered by MHPA by 
requiring equal terms and conditions between mental and general 
health.217 Since MHPAEA was enacted as a section of ERISA, it reaches 
far more mental health consumers than did MHPA and closes the self-
insured loophole.218 MHPAEA prevents discrimination against mental 
health consumers by mandating parity for treatment limitations and 
cost sharing provisions. 219 Specifically, it requires that group health 
plans providing mental health coverage may not establish more 
restrictive requirements or separate cost sharing requirements for 
mental health.220 The bar on cost sharing discrimination includes 
deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses.221
MHPAEA also protects mental health consumers from unequal 
treatment limitations222 by specifically mandating parity for “frequency 
of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits 
210  See also Kelly, supra note 45, at 9-10; Grob & Goldman, supra note 184; Barrett, supra note 28, 
at 1177-78.
211  Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, § 702, Pub. L. No. 104-204, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006); 
see also Grob & Goldman, supra note 184, at 168.
212  CRS History, supra note 168, at 7-11.
213  154 Cong. Rec. E1401 (2008) (speech of Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy). 
214  Tammy Worth, Mental Health Coverage Gets Shot at Parity, L.A. Times, October 13, 2008, at F3.  
215  Id.
216  See, e.g., Rosslyn Carter & Betty Ford, Mental Health Legislation We Need, Wash. Post, at A18 
(September 19, 2008).
217  29 U.S.C § 1185a(a)(3).
218  See Kelly, supra note 45, at 102 (noting that the Act had bipartisan support to close the ERISA 
exception to parity).
219  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3) (1996).
220  Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A).
221  Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(i).
222  Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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on scope or duration of treatment.”223 Treatment limitation parity was a 
major victory for mental health consumers as insurers have traditionally 
used cost shifting mechanisms to avoid MHPA parity mandates.224
MHPAEA does not offer full parity because it is a mandated-if-
offered statute, the weakest form of parity law.225 MHPAEA provides 
that if an employer offers mental health coverage, any financial 
requirements and treatment limitations must be “no more restrictive 
than the predominant financial requirements applied to substantially 
all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan.”226 As of 2007, 
six states (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana and Nebraska), 
had mandated-if-offered parity legislation.227 However, research has 
shown that mandated-if-offered parity legislation has no statistically 
significant effect on admissions and no significant reduction of the 
probability that an admitted mental health patient is uninsured.228 
Thus, the MHPAEA, like state mandated-if-offered legislation, cannot 
achieve full parity. 
1. Exemptions, Limitations, and Definitions 
Although MHPAEA retained the parity requirements for lifetime 
and annual caps from the MHPA,229 it also contains several exceptions. 
Specifically, MHPAEA retained the small business exception, which 
excludes businesses of fifty employees or less from parity.230 However, 
due to this one exemption alone, the MHPAEA does not cover over 
forty-five million employees who work for businesses with less than 
fifty employees.231 For instance, the Department of Labor reports 
that in March of 2008, over forty-nine million people were employed 
by businesses with less than fifty employees.232 In any given year 
approximately 20% of Americans suffer from a mental disorder, while 
15% of the adult population uses mental health services.233 Further, 
223  Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(ii).
224  See Grob & Goldman, supra note 184, at 167.
225  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 352.
226  Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 512a(a)(1) 
(2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a).
227  Dave Dhaval & Mukerjee Swati, Mental Health Parity Legislation, Cost-Sharing and Substance-
Abuse Treatment Admissions, 20 Health Econ. 161, 179 (2011).
228  Id. at 180.
229  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)-(2) (mandating parity for lifetime and annual policy limits for small 
group health plans that also provide mental health coverage).
230  Id. § 1185a(c)(1).
231  Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Quarterly Census of Emp’t and Wages, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/cew/ (last visited May 13, 2011). Since 2005, small businesses with 
less than forty-nine employees employed over forty-five million people annually. 2010 data is 
preliminary. Data on file with author. See Appendix 1. 
232  Id.
233  Karla Balling, A Family Impact Analysis of the Family Mental Health Parity Act, in Family 
Impact Analysis Series, Policy Inst. for Family Impact Seminars (2003) available at http://www.
familyimpactseminars.org/fia_analyses_fpmhp.pdf.
60 Federal Efforts to Achieve Mental Health Parity
the National Institute of Mental Health reported that in 2008, the 
prevalence of serious mental illness in the U.S. was over 4%.234 Thus, 
as a result of the small business exemption it is certain that millions of 
people affected by mental illness are outside the scope of MHPAEA.
MHPAEA also retained a cost-increase exemption similar to 
MHPA.235 Specifically, if mental health parity results in a cost increase 
of two percent in the first year of implementation, then the insurer may 
claim an exemption.236 Additionally, an insurer may also be exempt of 
it has a one percent cost increase in any subsequent year.237 
If such a cost is incurred, the plan is exempt for the plan 
year following the year the cost was incurred. Thus, the 
exemption lasts one year. After that, the plan is required 
to comply again; however, if the plan incurs an increased 
cost of at least one percent in that plan year, the plan 
could claim the exemption for the following plan year.238
However, the Department of Labor’s interim final regulations to 
implement MHPAEA do not provide any guidance for implementing 
the increased cost exemption.239 Thus, until future regulatory guidance 
is given, insurers seeking to claim the cost-increase exemption must 
follow the exemption procedures provided by the Department of Labor 
to implement MHPA regulations.240 Accordingly, insures seeking to 
apply for cost increase exemption must demonstrate that the cost 
increase was directly a result of the implementation of MHPAEA.241 
Further, applicants for a cost exemption must demonstrate that the 
increased cost was not a result of “trends in utilization and prices, 
a random claims experience that is unlikely to persist, or seasonal 
variation typically experienced in claims submission and payment 
patterns.”242 Finally, if an exemption is given, then the insurer is subject 
to government audits.243 
However, MHPAEA is also susceptible to insurers avoiding parity 
234  NIMH, Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among U.S. Adults by Age, Sex, and Race, 
available at http://nimh.nih.gov/statistics/SMI_AASR.shtml. 
235  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2).
236  Id.
237  Id. 
238  Dep’t of Labor, FAQ’s About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part V and Mental 
Health Parity Implementation, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca5.html (stating 
that small employers remain exempt from MHPAEA even after the passage of the PPACA).
239  Id.
240  Id. See also Interim Rules for Mental Health Parity, 62 Fed. Reg. 66932, (Dec. 22, 1997).
241  62 Fed. Reg. 66932, (Dec. 22, 1997).
242  Dep’t of Labor, supra note 238.
243  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2).
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because the law does not provide a provision to monitor compliance.244 
Monitoring compliance is necessary as insurance companies have 
proven to be creative in establishing new means of restricting access to 
mental health care. For instance, insurers have attempted to discourage 
mental health providers from participating in mental health plans by 
making reimbursement more difficult.245
Determining how to define mental illness has been an area of 
contention throughout the development of all mental health parity 
legislation.246 MHPAEA avoided the conflict with insurers by giving 
the insurer the authority to define mental illness.247 Some advocates of 
parity mistakenly assume that the definition of mental illness is based 
on serious mental illness, since DSM-IV is not used to define mental 
illness in MHPAEA.248 However, MHPAEA specifically provides that 
mental health conditions are “defined under the terms of the plan or 
coverage.”249 Thus, employers and insurers can arbitrarily cherry pick250 
the mental illnesses they will provide coverage for, if any, and defeat 
mental health parity entirely. 
MHPAEA is a step in the right direction; however it has left several 
options available for insurers and employers to avoid implementation. 
Moreover, as a mandated-if-offered statute, MHPAEA falls far short of 
full parity. 
C. The Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)251 and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA).252 The PPACA, as modified by 
the HCERA, takes some steps towards extending the reach of federal 
parity law. The Congressional intent behind the PPACA is to provide 
244  Barrett, supra note 28, at 1180 (discussing shortcomings of the Mental Health Parity & 
Addiction Equality Act of 2008). 
245  Id. (explaining that some insurance companies have made reimbursement so hard to navigate 
that mental-health professionals have dropped insurance plans that provide comprehensive 
mental-health benefits). 
246  See e.g., John C. Goodman & Wess Mitchell, The Case Against Mental Health Parity, Part III: Does 
the Care Really Work?, Brief Analysis No. 412, Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis 1 (2002) (criticizing 
any definition of mental illness based on DSM).
247  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4).
248  See Kelly, supra note 45, at 102 (stating that since DSM-IV has been dropped from the Act 
“it is more likely that ‘parity’ coverage will be extended on a priority basis to those with serious 
mental illness”).
249  See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4).
250  See Schmall, supra note 66, at 665 (discussing that employers may “exclude illnesses based on 
stereotypes, false assumptions, or costs … [while] overestimate[ing] the cost of providing mental 
health insurance”). 
251  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter 
PPACA]. 
252  Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
[hereinafter HCERA].
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health insurance to almost all U.S. citizens and legal immigrants by 
2014. In providing this coverage Congress also expanded insurance 
coverage to millions of Americans suffering from mental illness and 
substance abuse disorders.253 
As previously discussed, federal mental health parity law prior to 
PPACA did not include a mandate for mental health insurance coverage; 
rather federal legislation general required that when a benefit is offered 
it must be offered in parity, known as “mandated-if-offered” statutes. 
However, the PPACA is the first federal legislation to create a coverage 
mandate for mental health and substance abuse services.
Specifically, the PPACA provides that qualified health plans, 
certain Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans and 
plans offered through the individual market must provide an essential 
health benefits package. The PPACA defines essential health benefits 
broadly through ten general health care categories that include “mental 
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health 
treatment.”254 The PPACA does not specify what services are included 
in the essential health benefits categories, but the act provides that the 
scope of the essential health benefits should be equal to the benefits 
typically provided in an employer’s health insurance plan.255 The 
PPACA also provides additional guidance and definitions for the three 
plan types affected by the essential health benefits mandate. 
1. Qualified Health Plans (QHPs)
The PPACA defines qualified health plans as a properly certified 
plan that is issued or recognized by each exchange which offer the plan; 
that provides essential health benefits as described in the PPACA; and is 
offered by a licensed health insurance insurer.256 Qualified health plans 
that meet the statutory requirements of PPACA are required to include 
the essential health benefits package,257 which will extend mental health 
coverage to many Americans. However, this section alone does not 
mandate full parity because the PPACA does not specify what health 
care services must be included in the essential health benefits package.
253  See Brian Kopp, et al., New Federal Health Care Reform Legislation—Its Impact on Employers and 
Employee Benefits Plans, 2010 Emerging Issues 4954 (discussing expanded coverage under the 
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act).
254  See PPACA § 1302(b) (2011) (explaining that essential health benefits include: (1) ambulatory 
patient services, (2) emergency services, (3) hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5) 
mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment, (6) 
prescription drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) laboratory services, 
(9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric services, 
including oral and vision care).
255  See id.
256  See id. § 1301.
257  See id. § 1301(a)(1)(B). 
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2. Certain Medicaid Benchmark & 
Benchmark-Equivalent Plans
Medicaid is a federal entitlement program that is operated by the 
individual states.258 To be eligible for Medicaid, an applicant must meet 
certain group categorical and income requirements.259 Some groups are 
mandatory and must be accepted by the states, including “pregnant 
women, and poor individuals with disabilities or poor individuals over 
age 64 who qualify for cash assistance under the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program.”260 However, other groups are not mandatory, 
including pregnant women with an income between 133% and 185% of 
the federal poverty level.261
Medicaid plans are offered through traditional state benefit plans 
or state specified benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plans.262 Either 
of these options may be provided as a managed care plan or a non-
managed care plan. Under federal law enacted prior to the PPACA, all 
Medicaid managed care plans that provide both medical and surgical 
benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits must 
meet federal parity requirements.263
The PPACA expands Medicaid parity requirements by addressing 
the lack of parity in managed care Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-
equivalent plans. Specially, the PPACA provides that managed care 
Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans must provide 
the essential health benefits package,264 including “mental health and 
substance use disorder services.”265
The PPACA also expands mental health parity to certain non-
managed care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans that offer 
both medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance 
use disorder benefits.266 However, for these non-managed care plans, 
the PPACA only extends parity for treatment limitations and financial 
requirements.267 Congress has defined treatment limitations as “limits 
on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or 
258  See Julie Stone, Cong. Research Serv., Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) Provisions in PPACA: Summary and Timeline 4 (2010) (discussing the PPACA’s 
changes to Medicaid eligibility).
259  See id. (including children, pregnant women, families with dependent children, elderly, or 
disabled).
260  See id. (discussing mandatory groups, which states must cover under Medicaid). 
261  See id. (discussing optional eligibility groups, which states may choose to cover under 
Medicaid). 
262  Id. at 17.
263  Social Security Act § 1932(b)(8), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2010) [hereinafter SSA]. 
264  PPACA § 2001(c)(3). 
265  PPACA § 1302(b).
266  PPACA § 2001(c)(3). 
267  Id.
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other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”268 While 
financial requirements are defined as “deductibles, co-payments, 
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses, but excludes an aggregate 
lifetime limit and an annual limit.”269
The PPACA does advance mental health parity overall through the 
inclusion of mental health and substance abuse within the mandated 
essential health benefits; however, the impact of the essential health 
benefits package is currently unclear because their scope has yet to be 
defined through the rulemaking process.270
3. Individual & Small Group Market Plans 
The PPACA also requires new individual and small group market 
plans to include essential health benefits.271 Requiring the essential 
health benefits package, which includes mental health and substance 
abuse coverage, is a significant step. However, the PPACA also 
continues the MHPAEA small employer exception for businesses with 
less than fifty employees, which limits the expansion of parity.272 
Further, in some instances the PPACA even expands the reach of the 
small business exception by modifying the definition of small employer. 
Specifically, for group plans, which are nonfederal government plans, 
the definition of small employer was amended to mean “an employer 
who employed an average of at least 1 but not more than 100 employees 
on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs 
at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.”273 Thus, the PPACA 
has effectively extended the reach of the small employer exemption 
and further reduced the impact of the MHPAEA by doubling the size 
of the original definition of a small employer. 
4. Limitations of the PPACA
The PPACA is a significant step in increasing access to mental 
health care for millions of Americans. However, much like prior federal 
parity efforts, the PPACA leaves several options open for insurers 
and employers to avoid implementation. The PPACA mandates that 
qualified health plans, certain Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-
equivalent plans and plans offered through the individual market 
must provide essential health benefits. However, this mandate does 
268  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(B)(3)(B)(iii) (2010).
269  Id. § 300gg-26(B)(3)(B)(i).
270  Stone, supra note 258, at 17.
271  PPACA § 1201. 
272  PPACA § 1304(b); see also Dep’t of Labor, FAQ’s About Affordable Care Act Implementation 
Part V and Mental Health Parity Implementation (stating that small employers remain exempt 
from MHPAEA even after the passage of the PPACA), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/
faq-aca5.html. 
273  PPACA § 1304(b).
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not achieve full parity and in greatly weakened by changes to the small 
employer exception. 
Specifically, the PPACA does include mental health and substance 
abuse disorders in the essential health benefits package, but the scope 
of services that must be provided has not been specified.274 In terms 
of mental health coverage, the essential health benefits package only 
provides coverage for “mental health and substance use disorder 
services, including behavioral health treatment.”275 The PPACA does 
not mandate specific service or treatment; rather it only requires that 
coverage is provided in all ten broad categories. Many questions remain 
unanswered, such as if the essential health benefits package includes vital 
mental health services like preventive services or even case management. 
The PPACA has also hindered the achievement of mental health 
parity by expanding the small employer exemption to federal parity 
laws. By changing the definition of a small employer from fifty to one 
hundred employees, the mandate for essential health benefits is greatly 
weakened. Further, the PPACA continues many of the shortcomings of 
MHPAEA. For instance, the MHPAEA did not set a federal definition of 
mental illness, and in doing so avoided potential conflict with interest 
groups by allowing the insurer to define mental illness.276 Likewise, the 
PPACA does not set a federal definition of mental illness. Although 
the PPACA has taken some steps to provide health care coverage to 
Americans suffering from mental illness and substance abuse disorders, 
it is clear that the PPACA has yet to achieve full parity. 
VII. Policy Proposal: A Mental Health Parity Act with Teeth
Since federal legislation has yet to provide full mental health parity 
and end discriminatory practices targeted at mental health consumers, 
and because some states have yet to enact any form of parity legislation 
to protect mental health consumers,277 additional federal legislation 
must be advanced. 
Mental health parity legislation should be drafted with four 
underlying goals in mind. Parity should be implemented to: 1) 
counteract the scientifically tenuous and discriminatory distinction 
between mental illness and physical illness, 2) eliminate adverse 
selection through mandatory parity, 3) reduce out-of-pocket expenses 
for mental health consumers, and 4) to stimulate the economy by 
increasing the productivity and societal contributions of the people 
seeking mental health care.278 
274  Stone, supra note 258, at 17.
275  PPACA §1302(b)(1)(E).
276  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(e)(4).
277  See CRS History, supra note 168, at 15. 
278  See DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 13.
66 Federal Efforts to Achieve Mental Health Parity
Comprehensive mental health parity legislation should include 
four essential elements: 1) type of mandate, 2) terms and conditions, 3) 
definition of mental illness and 4) exemptions.279 First, considering the 
limitations of the mandated offering and mandated-if-offered statutes, 
anything short of mandated benefit legislation is unacceptable. As 
a foundation for parity policy this cannot be open to negotiation. 
Secondly, MHPAEA has already taken a significant step by requiring 
coverage terms and conditions to be in parity under a mandated-if-
offered policy.280 A policy favoring equality among coverage terms and 
conditions must be retained in any subsequent federal mental health 
parity legislation. With these two premises in mind, the next step in 
advancing mental health parity is to set a mental illness definition and 
any exemptions. 
A. Serious Mental Illness or DSM-IV?
A definition of mental illness must be set before Congress can 
adequately address the needs of mental health consumers. Setting a 
concrete definition for mental illness has been debated across academic 
disciplines.281 Defining what constitutes a mental illness is not as simple 
as defining general illnesses, since most mental illnesses do not have a 
biological marker.282 Although mental illnesses often affect the brain 
and are associated with brain chemistry, the root of mental illness is 
largely unknown. 283 
Before legislatures can adopt a definition of mental illness, a proper 
perspective for understanding and treating mental health must first 
be considered. One model for understanding mental health is the 
biomedical model.284 This model assumes that all illness or disease can 
“be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of measurable 
biological (somatic) variables.”285 Further “[t]he biomedical model not 
only requires that disease be dealt with as an entity independent of social 
behavior, it also demands that behavioral aberrations be explained on 
the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological) 
processes.”286 However, this model is very limiting in that it overlooks 
the impact that social and psychological factors have on mental health. 
For instance, under a biomedical model it would not be possible to 
279  Kaplan, supra note 1, at 351 (proposing another element in consideration of coverage for 
substance abuse).
280  29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A).
281  Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 9.
282  Id. See also Kelly, supra note 45, at 9 (stating that unlike communicable diseases, mental illness 
has “no pathogen–no viral infection–that can be readily identified and treated”). 
283  Kelly, supra note 45, at 9-10. 
284  George L. Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 Science 129 
(1977).
285  Id.
286  Id.
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explain why some patients experience depression symptoms as 
“mental illness,” while other patients regard the same symptoms as 
merely “problems of living.”287
However, mental illness can be more comprehensively understood 
from a “biopsychosocial” perspective, which in turn will allow for a 
broader definition of mental illness.288 According to the biopsychosocial 
model, biological, psychological, and social factors all have a significant 
role in human functioning in the context of disease or illness.289 The 
biological component attempts to understand the cause of the mental 
illness in terms of the functioning of the body. For instance, some 
people may be genetically predisposed to mental illness and more 
vulnerable than the average person.290 The psychological component 
attempts to understand how psychological problems may cause mental 
illness. For instance, there may be associations between certain patterns 
of thinking and mental illness.291 Specifically, a person prone to 
negative self-conclusions is more likely to become depressed.292 Finally, 
the social component attempts to understand how social factors like 
culture, socioeconomic status, and religion may impact mental health. 
For instance, mental illness may be triggered by a person’s traumatic 
and stressful life experiences.293 
Under the biopsychosocial model physicians evaluate how all three 
factors may contribute to the illness and patienthood, instead of merely 
considering biological factors alone.294 Thus, a valid definition for mental 
illness should account for each component of the biopsychosocial 
model in order to reach a broader section of mental health consumers.
One definition advanced by the Surgeon General defines mental 
illness as a term “refer[ing] collectively to all diagnosable mental 
disorders . . . [which] are characterized by abnormalities in cognition, 
emotion or mood, or the highest integrated aspects of behavior, such as 
social interactions or planning of future activities.”295 As Kelly adeptly 
points out, the operative word in the Surgeon General’s definition is 
diagnosable, which serves to separate mental illness from less serious 
life difficulties.296 Diagnosable means that the patient’s symptoms meet 
the designated observable or reportable level for a recognized mental 
illness in the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
287  See id.
288  Kelly, supra note 45, at 10.
289  Id.
290  Id.
291  Id.
292  Id.
293  Id.
294  Engel, supra note 284. 
295  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 39 (emphasis added).
296  See Kelly, supra note 45, at 10 (quoting the Surgeon General defining mental illness as 
“diagnosable mental disorders”).
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Mental Disorders.297 
The current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, was published by the American Psychiatric 
Association to provide 
diagnostic criteria for each mental disorder . . . as 
guidelines for making diagnoses, because it has been 
demonstrated that the use of such criteria enhances 
agreement among clinicians and investigators. . . .[The] 
diagnostic criteria and the DSM-IV Classification 
of mental disorders reflect a consensus of current 
formulations of evolving knowledge in [the] field.298
Typically, insurers require a diagnosis in accordance with DSM-
IV criteria for eligibility for mental health treatment.299 A definition 
of mental illness based on the DSM-IV has been advocated by 
scholars300 and adopted by twenty-nine states in mental health parity 
legislation as of 2007.301 However, opponents of mental health parity 
are hostile to a definition of mental illness based on DSM-IV.302 Parity 
opponents criticize Parity as defined by DSM-IV for allowing doctors 
to subjectively decide if a patient’s condition qualifies as a disorder.303 
Opposition also criticizes the DSM-IV for including disorders which 
they find undeserving of parity, including developmental-arithmetic 
disorder, oppositional-defiant disorder, caffeine intoxication and sleep 
disorders resulting from jet lag.304
Even parity proponents are divided as to if all 297 mental health 
disorders listed in DSM-IV should be treated equally.305 DSM-IV 
attempts to include “every possible category of mental illness regardless 
of severity … [and] includes forms of mental illness that do not warrant 
the same level of attention as, say, schizophrenia or major depression.”306 
297  See id. (describing how the DSM-IV is used to diagnose mental illness). 
298  See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-
IV, xxvii (4th ed. 1994) (describing the diagnostic criteria used in the mental health field).
299  See Kelly, supra note 45, at 110 (describing the importance of DSM-IV criteria in diagnosing 
mental illness and its general acceptance in the mental health field).
300  See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 360 (stating that “[a]t a minimum, [effective] legislation 
should incorporate the definition of mental illness from the most recent edition of the DSM-IV”); 
see also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1194 (advocating that Wisconsin should adopt mental health 
parity legislation based on DSM-IV).
301  CRS History, supra note 168, at 15.
302  Goodman and Mitchell, supra note 246, at 1 (stating that “[o]ne problem [with the DSM] is 
that there is no objective biological test to identify a mental disorder—not even schizophrenia).
303  Id.
304  See, e.g., id. and Schmall, supra note 66, at 665 (discussing other controversial disorders listed 
in the DSM-IV including sleep disorders resulting from jet lag, eating disorders, attention deficits 
and antisocial psychoses).
305  Kelly, supra note 45, at 11-12.
306  Id. at 12.
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As a compromise, the concept of serious mental illness (“SMI”) has 
been adopted in eleven state parity statutes.307 Although a consensus 
definition has not emerged, the Surgeon General has stated that SMI 
“generally applies to mental disorders that interfere with some area of 
social functioning . . . [and] includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
and other severe forms of depression, panic disorder, and obsessive 
compulsive disorder.”308 
The Surgeon General’s SMI definition includes psychotic mood 
and anxiety disorders, which respectively are the most severe and the 
most common mental illnesses.309 However, this definition excludes: 
personality disorders; child disorders such as attention deficit disorder, 
and hyperactivity disorder; eating disorders and substance abuse 
disorders, which are also common, debilitating and disabling.310 
Thus, a definition for SMI should include the disorders included by 
the Surgeon General but must also include psychotic disorder, mood 
disorder, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, childhood disorders, 
eating disorders and substance abuse disorders. 311 Only by mandating 
parity according to this definition can policy makers ensure that those 
most in need of care are protected.312 
Further, the proposed SMI definition of mental illness for policy 
purposes will enable Congress to draft a bill that will face less 
opposition by not covering politically sensitive and controversial DMS-
IV diagnoses, such as jet lag and caffeine intoxication. Moreover, the 
proposed SMI definition will not service an overbroad population. For 
example, in 2006, it was estimated that 6% or 13.2 million adults in 
the U.S. suffer from SMI.313 While in 2005, it was estimated that 26.2% 
or 57.7 million adults in the U.S. had a mental illness as defined by 
the DSM-IV, which includes individuals with little or no daily life 
disruption.314 Since the proposed SMI definition is congruent with the 
biopsychosocial model, while simultaneously prioritizing care and 
resources to people with the most serious need, the proposed SMI 
definition should be adopted in future legislation.
307  CRS History, supra note 168, at 15.
308  Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 46. 
309  Kelly, supra note 45, at 12-13.
310  Id. at 13.
311  Id. at 96-97. In regards to personality disorders, many mental health professionals believe that 
personality disorders are the result of a patient’s childhood and adolescent experiences. “However, 
some data from family, twin, and adoption studies has suggested that biology does play a part 
in these disorders.” Utah Psych, Personality Disorder (2010), available at http://www.utahpsych.
org/personality.htm. Further, studies have found a genetic link for both antisocial and borderline 
personality disorders. Thus, personality disorders are accounted for by the biopsychosocial and 
should be protected by mental health parity legislation. Id.
312  Kelly, supra note 45, at 97.
313  Id. at 13. See also Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that, in 1999, the Surgeon 
General reported that 5.4% of adults suffer from SMI.). 
314  Kelly, supra note 45, at 96.
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B. Applicable Exemptions, Political Reality and Compromise
Federal parity legislation and state parity legislation have included 
compliance exemptions for small businesses and a cost increase 
exemption for employers.315 A perfect political climate would allow for 
exemption-free legislation similar to California or Vermont. However, 
exemptions have been provided as compromises to reduce opposition 
from interest groups and thus ensure that the legislation is adopted.316
Seventeen states include a small business exemption to their mental 
health parity legislation.317 These exemptions apply to employers with 
less than a designated number of employees, ranging from 10 to 51.318 
Parity opponents routinely cite a fear of a rise in healthcare costs as 
a result of parity.319 Providing a small business exemption will help 
prevent further opposition. A small business exemption was included 
in MHPA and the MHPAEA and remains a political necessity to 
successfully enact further mental health parity legislation.
Fourteen states include a cost-increase exemption to their mental 
health parity legislation.320 These exemptions generally provide that 
“if a health plan demonstrates that providing parity mental health 
coverage raises the premium cost by more than a given %, they may 
be exempt from the mental health parity requirements.” However, as 
demonstrated with the examination of California’s and Utah’s parity 
legislation, large employers should not expect a cost increase over 
one percent and may even realize a reduction in overall cost. Even if a 
modest cost-increase exemption is provided in future legislation, it is 
unlikely that large employers will experience a cost-increase necessary 
to qualify for an exemption. Accordingly, a modest one to two percent 
cost-increase exemption should be included in future parity legislation. 
This cost-increase exemption ultimately will not bar mental health 
consumers from treatment, while its exclusion will increase opposition 
among businesses and interest groups. Thus, to gain maximum support 
for parity legislation, a small business and a modest cost-increase 
exemption should be included.
Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?
The enactment of the MHPAEA and the PPACA were a significant 
315  Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at 3.
316  Mari C. Kjorstad, The Current and Future State of Mental Health Insurance Parity Legislation, 27 
Psychiatric Rehabilitation J. 34, 37-38 (2003).
317  CRS History, supra note 168, at 15-16.
318  Id. at 16. 
319  See, e.g., Goodman and Mitchell, supra note 246 (stating that the U.S. spends the largest 
percentage of national income in the world on healthcare and generally expressing concerns 
about additional costs imposed by parity).
320  CRS History, supra note 168, at 15-16.
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step in the right direction towards parity, but to achieve full parity 
Congress must pass mandated benefit legislation. However, society’s 
discriminatory view and the stigma placed on mental healthcare must 
be challenged before parity is truly achieved. Although parity legisla-
tion in some states has increased access to care and the quality of life 
for mental health consumers, other states have adopted inadequate po-
lices or nothing at all. Therefore, federal legislation is the only avenue 
available to ensure parity for all Americans. Accordingly, the policy 
recommendations in this article should be adopted as the next step to-
wards full parity for mental health consumers.  
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